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Reactions to Discretionary Trusts:
An Update by Richard C. Ausness
Gerry W. Beyer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although I have known Prof. Ausness for many years by both reputation and e-mail communications, we have never met in person. After a
careful study of his article, Discretionary Trusts: An Update, I wondered
if perhaps he had surreptitiously attended my classes when I discussed
discretionary trusts because his organization, focus, and analysis closely
track how I present these topics to my students. Virtually every major
point I hope my students to “takeaway” after I cover discretionary and
support trusts is covered clearly and concisely in the article. In fact, I
already plan to recommend this article to my students as an excellent
source to supplement my lectures.
II. THE ARTICLE OBJECTIVELY
When Prof. Bridget Crawford asked me to review Prof. Ausness’
article, she indicated that she was not seeking “a descriptive summary of
it.”1 And, I agree – you should first read the article to form your own
unbiased opinion before you check out my thoughts. So, I will forego
the traditional part of a review where the author provides the
CliffsNotes2 version of the article. Nonetheless, I believe it would an
injustice to any review of the article to fail to mention some of the article’s technical highpoints.
Prof. Ausness masterfully organizes his update on discretionary
trusts. Whether you are a long-time trust expert looking for a refresher
or a novice struggling to learn basic concepts for the first time, you are
guided logically from an academic discussion of the different meanings
* Governor Preston E. Smith Regents Professor of Law, Texas Tech University
School of Law. B.A. 1976, Eastern Michigan University; J.D. 1979, Ohio State University;
LL.M. 1983 & J.S.D. 1990, University of Illinois.
1 Email from Bridget Crawford, Prof., Pace Univ. School of Law, to Gerry W.
Beyer, Prof., Texas Tech Univ. School of Law (Sept. 7, 2017, 17:50 EST) (on file with
author).
2 See CLIFFSNOTES, https://www.cliffsnotes.com/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2018) (providing study guides which originally summarized major literary works to shorten a student’s
study time).
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of discretion,3 through the dichotomy of mandatory versus discretionary
trust provisions,4 and how courts5 and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
have addressed discretionary provisions.6 Prof. Ausness then focuses the
reader’s attention on the rights of both beneficiaries7 and creditors8 to
enforce and compel distributions from discretionary trusts. And finally,
like all good authors, he concludes with his recommendations for improving discretionary trust jurisprudence.9
Prof. Ausness’ writing style is enviable. In fact, I often found myself
saying, “I wish I had written this.” Beyond the usual signals of good
writing such as sentence structure, word choice, grammar, and paragraph flow, what is particularly impressive is his skillful job of weaving
the basic legal principles with the cases to support them. A quick
Westlaw search yielded almost 1,500 state court cases discussing discretionary trusts10 which gives you some idea of how difficult it was for
Prof. Ausness to decide the cases on which to focus. I also appreciated
that he selected major cases from a wide range of jurisdictions and
dates.
III. SUGGESTIONS EVALUATED
Prof. Ausness concludes his article by making several suggestions
for improving the law of discretionary trusts.11 I think these are both
accurate and insightful. For example, he recommends that a court
should be able to find an abuse of discretion if the trustee acted unreasonably (an objective test) rather than using the subjective bad faith
test.12 This test, in the absence of the settlor providing an explicit test in
the trust, provides, I think, the right balance of carrying out the settlor’s
intent and protecting the beneficiary from a rogue trustee. Although
reasonable people may differ as to what is reasonable, it is better than
relying on a pure good faith test which relies on what is inside of a trus3 Richard C. Ausness, Discretionary Trusts: An Update, 43 ACTEC L.J. 231, 233236 (2018).
4 Id. at 236-39.
5 Id. at 239-43.
6 Id. at 243-46.
7 Id. at 246-63.
8 Id. at 263-80.
9 Id. at 280-83.
10 Search for state law cases discussing discretionary trusts, WESTLAW, https://
next.westlaw.com (follow “Sign in” hyperlink; then search for “adv: discretionary /2
trust!” in the database of “All States”).
11 Ausness, supra note 3, at 280-83.
12 Id. at 280-81.
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tee’s mind and in the absence of a reliable truth machine,13 can never be
ascertained with certainty. Likewise, I agree with his characterization of
key terms used in discretionary trusts such as “support” and “maintenance” as having similar meanings and “best interests” and “welfare”
allowing for “luxuries that go beyond mere support.”14
Prof. Ausness’ recommendation “to abandon the practice of characterizing the interest of the beneficiary of a pure discretionary trust as an
‘expectancy’”15 also has merit as the beneficiary does have an actual
interest although that interest, just a like a traditional contingent remainder, may never come into possession. Another wise suggestion is to
allow creditors with claims for necessaries supplied to the beneficiary to
be able to reach funds in a support trust for the payment of their
claims.16
IV. THE QUIBBLES
Notwithstanding my previous glowing critique of Prof. Ausness’ article and the fact I take no exception to what he has to say, there were
indeed several things that puzzled me. Let’s take a look at a few of
these.
A. The Minor Ones
1. Omission of Statutory Law on Trustee Discretion Review and
Standards
Prof. Ausness discusses when courts elect to review a trustee’s exercise in discretion and the standards they use.17 Although his coverage of
caselaw is more than adequate for an update article, I was disappointed
not to see a discussion of applicable state statutory law. For example,
the Texas Trust Code directly addresses the issue of whether a court may
review the conduct of a trustee of a discretionary trust when it states,
Notwithstanding the breadth of discretion granted to a trustee
in the terms of the trust, including the use of terms such as
“absolute,” “sole,” or “uncontrolled,” the trustee shall exercise
a discretionary power in good faith and in accordance with the
terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the
beneficiaries.18
13 See JAMES L. HALPERIN, THE TRUTH MACHINE (1996) (exploring the implications of a scientist’s development of an infallible lie detector).
14 Ausness, supra note 3, at 281.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 282.
17 Id. at 239-43.
18 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.029(a) (West 2017).
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Texas law likewise provides that, “The trustee shall administer the trust
in good faith according to its terms and this subtitle”19 thereby adopting
the subjective standard.
2. Lack of Discussion of First vs. Last Dollar Issue with Support
Trusts
In Prof. Ausness’ coverage of support trusts,20 I appreciated his discussion of the mandatory versus discretionary distinction and his consideration of whether the trustee should consider the beneficiary’s other
resources. I would, however, also like to have seen him discuss how support trusts should be presumptively considered. Is the beneficiary entitled to funds from a mandatory support trust only if the beneficiary
lacks sufficient resources perhaps incentivizing the beneficiary to be unemployed so the beneficiary can receive trust property? Or, does the
beneficiary automatically receive the funds necessary for support with
anything extra the beneficiary earns being available for the beneficiary’s
non-support enjoyment which would drain the trust of funds that may
later be needed?
3. Insufficient Coverage of Interface with Spendthrift Provisions
In the rights of creditors discussion,21 I think it would have been
helpful if Prof. Ausness had included a more comprehensive discussion
of the interface between discretionary/support trusts and spendthrift
provisions. He explains how courts view these trusts when they lack a
spendthrift clause, how support trusts are often deemed impliedly
spendthrift, and that discretionary trusts lack an interest which a creditor may attach. In actuality, it would be extremely rare to find a discretionary or support trust that did not also include a spendthrift provision.
Perhaps Prof. Ausness did not want to “muddy the waters” by opening
the door to a discussion of spendthrift trust issues which would have
increased the length of his already ample paper, but I do think his discussion would have been more realistic with enhanced coverage of
spendthrift provisions.
4. Failure to Discuss Specific Child Support Discretionary Trust
Legislation
Prof. Ausness provides a look into the issues that arise when the
beneficiary’s children attempt to reach through the “shield” of a discre19
20
21

Id. § 113.051.
Ausness, supra note 3, at 247.
Id. at 263-80.
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tionary trust to reach funds for delinquent child support.22 Being a professor at a Texas law school, I was pleased when he cited one of the
leading Texas cases on this point, Kolpack v. Torres.23 However, my
pleasure turned quickly to disappointment when Prof. Ausness did not
cover the special Texas statute that provides a definitive rule to resolve
the issue. The Texas Family Code (yes, the Family Code, not the Trust
Code which does make the provision difficult to locate as there is no
reference to it in the Trust Code), provides:
Sec. 154.005. Payments of Support Obligation by Trust. (a)
The court may order the trustees of a spendthrift or other trust
to make disbursements for the support of a child to the extent
the trustees are required to make payments to a beneficiary
who is required to make child support payments as provided
by this chapter.
(b) If disbursement of the assets of the trust is discretionary, the court may order child support payments from the income of the trust but not from the principal.24
B. The Major One
As I come to the conclusion of my concerns with Prof. Ausness’
article, the time has come to mention the one the irks me the most. And,
it is also the one that I find irking me about too many law review articles
that I review – limited practitioner advice. My belief is that every law
review article, unless purely historical or philosophical, should contain
recommendations for our practicing bar, especially when the article appears in a journal distributed primarily to practitioners which is this case
are fellows of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel who
are the icons of the practicing estate planning bar in the United States.
Prof. Ausness concludes merely by saying that discretionary trusts
are “worthy of continuing study by legal scholars and practitioners.”25
True, I completely agree. However, at this point, I would have appreciated seeing a list of steps practitioners could take when drafting discretionary trusts to address the issues previously covered with such
expertise. For example, Prof. Ausness could have explained that a discretionary support trust should directly explain when and how the beneficiary’s other resources should be considered. In addition, he could
have stressed the importance of indicating the level of support the set22

Id. at 273.
Id. at 274 (citing Kolpack v. Torres 828 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. App. 1992)). See also id.
at 273-74 (recognizing split of case law authority but not mentioning statutory
provisions).
24 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.005 (West 2017).
25 Ausness, supra note 3, at 283.
23

440

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:435

tlor intends the beneficiary to receive from the trust. To elaborate this
point — Prof Ausness explained that a support trust usually maintains
the beneficiary’s accustomed lifestyle except if it is very low.26 However,
it would be prudent for the attorney to ask the client what the client
intends – perhaps the client desires to increase the lifestyle of a beneficiary from modest to high, maintain the beneficiary’s lavish lifestyle, or
merely provide a safety net if the beneficiary experiences financial hard
times.
V. CONCLUSION
So, what would my “final answer”27 be in response to the question,
“What do you think of how Prof. Ausness handled discretionary trusts in
his new article?” I would start by explaining that his well-crafted and
superbly researched article provides an excellent presentation of basic
legal principles and cases demonstrating those rules. As such, his article
makes a valuable additional to our collective knowledge and one I recommend without hesitation to someone who wants to be brought “up to
speed”28 on the interpretation of trusts containing discretionary and
support provisions. However, I would not be able to muster full and
unbridled enthusiasm because the article fails to “bring it on home”29 by
providing useful advice to estate planning practitioners.

26

Id. at 261.
See Carrie Grosvenor, Unforgettable Game Show Catch Phrases, THOUGHTCO.
(updated Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.thoughtco.com/best-game-show-catch-phrases1396892. See also Lauren Duca, The Final Answer on “Who Wants to be a Millionaire?,”
15 Years After it Premiered, HUFFPOST TV (Aug. 15, 2014 9:20 AM, updated on Dec. 6,
2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/15/millionaire-15-years_n_5673088.html.
28 See BARBARA ANN KIPFER, THE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG (4th ed.
2007) (defining this phrase to mean increasing the operation of a motor, especially of a
phonograph turntable, to the proper rate).
29 SONNY BOY WILLIAMSON II, BRING IT ON HOME (Checker Records 1966). See
also LED ZEPPELIN, BRING IT ON HOME (Atlantic Records 1969) (paying homage to
Sonny Boy Williamson’s version of this song in its intro and outro).
27

